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TRANSFORMING THE COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE OF UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND TO PROSECUTE THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
The struggle against global terrorism is different from any other war in our history. It will be fought on many fronts against a particularly elusive enemy over an extended period of time.
1  GEORGE W. BUSH
The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), through its short history, has attained a high level of competency in dealing with service-like issues. The challenge now is for USSOCOM to create that same fidelity in developing a strategic reach as a global combatant commander. This paper will propose building a subordinate unified command with the sole purpose of prosecuting the global war on terrorism. The organization will develop deployable standing joint force headquarters elements with a world-wide commitment while leveraging existing relationships built by the theater special operations commands with the geographic combatant commands. This modular, flexible command and control team is vital as USSOCOM becomes more of a supported command vice a supporting command. This relationship will be evident from the USSOCOM headquarters all the way down to the individual special operations components in the theater. This proposal gives the greatest adaptability to both USSOCOM and the combatant command regardless of the command relationship, and in this new strategic environment of asymmetrical threats, that adaptability will give the United
States the advantage required to aggressively take the fight to the enemy.
After the events on September 11, 2001 , the United States' secure, peaceful world was shattered by the hands of a new enemy -terrorism. Military forces jumped into action against this adversary not only in Afghanistan but in countries all around the world. The new threat and its asymmetric form of warfare have forced an exponential increase to the ongoing military transformation. USSOCOM is heavily involved in operations against the new threat. Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Donald Rumsfield forced a paradigm shift when he mandated that USSOCOM be the lead agency and supported command in the global war on terrorism.
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Transformation was already in the works at USSOCOM but the mandate accelerated the shift in the direction USSOCOM was heading. USSOCOM's 2003 Posture Statement gave direction to begin the transformational shift into a global war fighting command. The leadership and vision is a good start but only a start to an aggressive metamorphosis which will be required to meet the full intent of the SecDef's mandate and the shift to a supported combatant commander. In today's global environment, asymmetric thinking is vital during unconventional warfare operations, especially when it comes to command and control of special operations forces conducting a plethora of strategic operations from major force engagements to small teams conducting covert actions.
As the supported commander, executing the transformational plan will enhance the opportunity for USSOCOM to be the Joint Force Commander (JFC) with the other combatant commands being in a supporting role. The new operational construct will be situational dependent and may take on many different structures. In a global war on terrorism, the campaign will be fought around the world and across the full spectrum of warfare. The majority of the actions will be against high value targets with both military and political strategic importance. To prosecute numerous operations quickly and efficiently, USSOCOM will employ small unconventional warfare ground teams supported by conventional forces --predominantly air forces. To meld conventional and special operations forces into an interdependent combat force, USSOCOM must build a modular building block command and control hierarchy from USSOCOM down to the specific components of the Special Operations Forces (SOF) team.
This is another paradigm shift in the structure and responsibilities of USSOCOM.
In order to establish the proper command and control network to have a global JFC capability, USSOCOM needs to emphasize a transformation into the supported combatant command function. The transformation for USSOCOM will require a restructuring of current USSOCOM initiatives to follow standing joint protocol. This will enhance the interdependence between USSOCOM, in the supported command role, and the other geographical combatant commands (GCC), in a supporting role. Developing a new sub-unified command as the foundation, a leaner, more modular transformation vision will be proposed. The new organization design will capitalize on existing initiatives like the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) and existing organizations like the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) to be force multipliers in this global campaign.
The transformation will be to a network centric command and control organization capable of global strikes from the United States, precision engagements from forward based forces, and combined operations across the entire spectrum of warfare from pre-crisis activities to major force engagements. This is a major shift from the supporting, service-like headquarters established by congress under the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT-TITLE 10 SERVICE-LIKE DEVELOPMENT • develop strategy, training, and doctrine.
• validate and establish priorities for requirements.
• prepare and submit to Secretary of Defense program recommendations and budget proposals for special operations and other forces assigned to USSOCOM.
• exercise authority, direction, and control over the expenditure of funds for forces assigned to USSOCOM and for special operations forces assigned to unified combatant commands other than the USSOCOM.
• and develop and acquire special operations-peculiar equipment. Even in force structure, USSOCOM as always has been on the cutting edge. His new organizational structure focused the headquarters staff's attention on the resourcing of SOF.
The reorganization enabled the commander to concentrate efforts on strategic and operational priorities as required in Title 10 and the management of MFP-11 funding.
As we move into a world of asymmetric threats and the global war on terrorism, USSOCOM will not only need to maintain its level of service-like fidelity in its management of SOF but will need to enhance its global strategic reach as a world-wide supported combatant command. The threat is real and it is up to USSOCOM to meet that threat.
9-11 -TRANSFORMING INTO A GLOBALLY SUPPORTED COMMAND
The beginnings of USSOCOM's transformation began before the events of 11 September 2001. Initiatives were being developed and exercised from major commands down to specific units. Exercises were being planned to test the interoperability and feasibility of these fledgling ideas. Everything was moving along at a steady pace to ensure the successful integration of these elements into the joint team when the world suddenly changed overnight. The enemy accelerated our Observe-Orient-Decide-Act loop and time for experimentation had accelerated into time for implementation. The exercise scenario would now be combat in the mountain ranges of Afghanistan and the deserts of Iraq.
The emergence of terrorism forced all services to take a different look at transformation to combat the primary threat to our national security. The 2003 Posture Statement stated, "the primary objective of transformation is to increase the margin of our advantage over potential adversaries in all facets of warfare. These facets of warfare include projecting power to any location on the globe at a time of our choosing…"
7 The Posture Statement lists vectors and attributes for transformation for USSOCOM. The attributes to enable USSOCOM's mission include:
• Precision strike and effects
• Tailored and integrated operations
• Ubiquitous access
• Regional expertise, presence, and influence
• C4ISR dominance
• Technology advancements 8 USSOCOM, as the primary supported commander in the war on terrorism, is faced with one of the greatest transformation challenges ever -how to go from a functional command with service-like Title 10 responsibilities to a global combatant command fighting a trans-national enemy. The key link to being a world-wide supported command is a robust command and control system. With limited manpower resources, this system will have to leverage specific expertise from other organizations and subordinate commands. USSOCOM will need to take conventional thinking and institutions and modify them to meet the fluid environment of special operations. Just like Jimmy Doolittle, USSOCOM will need to strip down the peripheral baggage from the current command and control network and develop a leaner and modular solution that will provide robust capabilities to support global counterterrorist operations. That current network is the Center for Special Operations.
CENTER FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS
The Center for Special
Operations ( This was the first major organizational transformation movement by USSOCOM to be a supported command in the global war on terrorism. This paradigm shift to the CSO construct brought with it a shift in force structure and the fiscal requirements needed to standup a new division capable of executing the command and control function. In the President's fiscal year 2004 budget, USSOCOM received a budget increase to $4.5 billion and a manning increase of 2,563 personnel slots in critical mission areas, many in command and control specialty codes.
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The CSO is a good start in the transformation to a combatant command for USSOCOM.
To concentrate the energy and increase unity of effort, the CSO needs to be separated from the headquarters and the day to day Title 10 responsibilities that the command faces. Coalescing it into a sub-unified command with the autonomy to prosecute the global campaign would demonstrate the resolve USSOCOM has to stay the course over the long haul. The CSO will be subsumed into a sub-unified command called Joint Task Force -Global Terrorism (JTF-GT).
FIGURE 2. CSO ORGANIZATION
Within the sub-unified command USSOCOM will leverage and modify an initiative started by Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), the concept of the SJFHQ. This expertise will be linked with the regional expertise of the TSOC. The combination of the concepts will develop the scalable command and control structure USSOCOM needs to be a global supported commander.
STANDING JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS
One of the top initiatives for transformation has been the concept of a SJFHQ. The
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), published shortly after 9/11, listed as one of its four pillars of transformation, "strengthening joint operations through SJFHQ, improved joint command and control, joint training, and an expanded joint force presence policy." 11 JFCOM defines the SJFHQ as a team of operational planners and information command and control specialists.
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The SJFHQ does not replace the JFC's staff but augments them by providing a core element that is rapidly deployable in response to any crisis within a combatant commands Area of Responsibility (AOR). This team of experts forms the backbone of the Joint Task Force (JTF) command structure.
The SJFHQ has moved from a conceptual idea to an operational construct. 
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The initiative in PACOM is similar to the construct in Europe but still different enough that they are not interchangeable. PACOMs construct, the Joint Mission Force, is structured different than the EPOC. Some of the organizational requirements are based on regional requirement's which is only natural but others are just the desired organization of the current leadership. In a focused joint world, all the SJFHQ would be organized and equipped the same to enhance interoperability. JFCOM will be an invaluable tool in training the JTF-GT as it stands up its SJFHQ.
Utilizing the construct of the SJFHQ will enable USSOCOM to rapidly deploy mission expertise anywhere in the world. The scalable, modular team will have the required technology to reach-back to Tampa for additional subject matter expert support. To complete the interdependent team, regional expertise will be required. This regional expertise will come from the TSOC.
THEATER SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMANDS -REGIONAL EXPERTISE
The TSOCs will be a vital cog in the counter-terrorist machine. They will be the link between the GCC and USSOCOM working with or through JTF-GT. They are the regional expertise that the deployable team from JTF-GT can build upon to form a robust forward deployed headquarters element. Their forward posture allows them to respond rapidly to any situation that arises within their AOR. They will normally be the first on scene, operating under either command of the GCC or USSOCOM. Irrespective of command relationship, the TSOC will be required to communicate situational awareness back to the appropriate command.
The TSOCs require the same upgrades and interoperability in their communications equipment as does the JTF-GT headquarters. The TSOCs need to communicate with USSOCOM, through JTF-GT for operations, and with their day to day operational command, the GCC. The QDR states, "…a joint command and control structure must reside not only at the joint command, but also extend down to the operational service components." If the situation dictates that USSOCOM be the supported commander, the TSOC JTF will be the foundation that the USSOCOM SJFHQ team will build upon to establish a robust interdependent organization. This regionally oriented, network centric team will be focused on the prosecution of the world-wide campaign against terrorism. In order to maintain focus, a new sub-unified command under USSOCOM will be charged with the mission of eradication of terrorism around the world. That sub-unified command will be JTF-GT.
JOINT TASK FORCE -GLOBAL TERRORISM
USSOCOM must structure its global terror campaign element along a common joint architecture to increase interoperability with the other GCCs. With the new force structure, USSOCOM would eliminate from USSOCOM headquarters the CSO and incorporate its assets into a new sub-unified standing JTF. The new command would be named the Joint Task Force -Global Terrorism. USSOCOM's organizational chart would have five subordinate elements.
FIGURE 3. PROPOSED USSOCOM COMMAND STRUCTURE
To fully apply the proper force structure to the new sub-unified command, USSOCOM would incorporate the current CSO staff as the core element to build JTF-GT. They would then task the other subordinate commands to staff the majority of the new billets. Combined, they would form the core of a SJFHQ within JTF-GT. This would align USSOCOM with the other GCCs to have a deployable SJFHQ. This construct would allow USSOCOM to prosecute the war on terrorism from the Joint Operations Center (JOC) in Tampa or deploy the SJFHQ element to any theater to conduct operations either as a supported command or a supporting command. Because of the global extent of the campaign and the time constraints of high value strategic targets, JTF-GT will need two deployable SJFHQ elements. The size of these elements will be smaller than the JFCOM model which is attributable to two factors.
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The first factor is the reach-back capability the deployed team would have into the JOC in Tampa. Within the JOC there would reside a preponderance of the interagency coordination, intelligence resources, and teams that can plan for follow on operations. The second factor contributing to the smaller footprint is the modular approach to utilizing the TSOCs task force architecture to provide augmentation and regional expertise.
For JTF-GT the organizational chart will be focused to provide a structure with minimal division of tasks. The ability to keep the organization simple is attributable to the narrow focus of the mission, global terrorism, and the desire for a small forward footprint. JTF-GT will be divided into the following divisions: Operations, Strategic Plans, Intelligence/Interagency, Support, and Special Projects. There will also be a JOC manned from personnel from all the other divisions. Interoperability will be garnered through a symbiotic command and control communications network. The network will provide a common operating picture vertically to each division and horizontally to the other commands. This will provide the combat forces and the battle staff a reach-back capability to enhance centralized control and decentralized execution of SOF missions.
Of all the divisions mentioned, the operations division will be the most robust. Under its umbrella will be the aviation, naval, and ground forces; information operations to include psychological operations; and a small compartmented cell to handle covert operations. They will develop courses of action and direct operations from pre-crisis activities through small scale contingencies. The operations division will be the focal point for instituting the supported relationships with conventional forces.
The Strategic Plans division will not only develop the strategic plans but also provide liaison teams to the other combatant commands. The liaison teams will develop the relationships within the GCC staff to avoid any animosity that may arise depending on the supported and supporting command relationship between the two entities. These teams will be part of the deployable SJFHQ to capitalize on that relationship. The liaison teams would work closely with the special operations regional experts; the TSOCs.
These deployable elements would fall in with the TSOC to form the overarching headquarters team. To successfully integrate the different echelons of command and control, every TSOC needs to establish a common JTF organizational construct within their command.
SOCPAC is already postured for this but the other TSOCs would need to identify and organize along the same lines. Once this occurs, the JTF-GT element combined with the TSOC JTF will be the forward deployed command and control headquarters to prosecute the operations. This organization fills the need to operate across the full spectrum of control as a JFC, a JTF, or a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). This is a scalable, modular approach to command and control that will be required to successfully prosecute the global war on terror.
This construct gives USSOCOM a standing command and control network down the chain of command that is tailorable to any situation, anywhere in the world. The commonality of equipment especially communications will provide the USSOCOM or GCC commander with a network centric organization capable of full spectrum special operations dominance.
Within the JTF-GT JOC and subordinate Air Operations Center (AOC), USSOCOM must overcome the joint communications problems that always seem to hamper joint operations.
SOF forces operate with discreet equipment and on different cryptological data than conventional forces. This is due to the operational security requirements associated with the strategic nature of special operation missions. With air operations being conducted across the full spectrum of conventional and SOF capabilities, it is imperative to have reliable communications that all players can access regardless of service. JTF-GT will be required to establish joint equipment and data nets that all services can operate given limitations and constraints possessed by each service. Communications have always been the long pole in any operation and the nature, speed, and security of counter-terrorism missions make the common communications network a must.
To develop a global organization of this nature from square one would take more time than the enemy is willing to give USSOCOM. In order to maintain the initiative, USSOCOM will leverage the CSO resources, retain the special operations unconventional mind set, and exploit off the shelf technology modified to meet the needs of the nation. This forward deployed headquarters will have the capability to command and integrate all components of SOF from ground to air. The special operations relationship with the air component is very important and robust due to the nature of the missions. Air support to SOF was a vital link during Operation
Enduring Freedom and a link that must be enhanced to ensure the interoperability required for SOF missions and the concept of a modular command and control architecture will bring this to fruition.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION COMMAND AND CONTROL
JTF-GT will allow the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) to develop the air centric command and control system. Currently, AFSOC has an element within its staff system that has been trained to conduct the important function of the JFCOM liaison element. AFSOC possesses a 15-man liaison element that is comprised of three teams which are regionally focused for PACOM, EUCOM, and Central Command. • The JSOTF commander did not fully understand the extent of his authority within his Area of Operations.
• The lack of fire support organization within the JSOTF/HQ and the SOLE led to limited air support.
• The JSOTF needed a more robust operations center to facilitate all air support. In the global campaign on terrorism, the preponderance of forces will be SOF and air power. The missions will be short, quick, and decisive in nature. There may be multiple operations being conducted in parallel in different theaters. This type of strategic operation requires USSOCOM to be forward deployed, to increase combat strength, and to concentrate their efforts to prosecute the war as a combatant command. There are plans to stand up a JSOAC in the Special Operations Command -Europe (SOCEUR) area of responsibility. This is only the initial change in force structure that USSOCOM needs to address to bring symmetry across the globe and increase the forward presence of combat power to quickly and decisively defeat emerging terrorist threats.
USSOCOM has been regionally oriented since its conception. On the aviation side, currently there are SOGs in the European and Pacific theaters. The 16 SOW stationed at Hurlburt Field, Florida is responsible for South America and the Middle East. Over the past decade, the operations tempo in the CENTCOM AOR has been extremely high especially for the SOF aviation assets. To remedy the burden of command and control of the aviation assets, a SOG and JSOAC need to be established within the CENTCOM AOR to align that theater with the other GCC to maintain the premise of commonality.
FIGURE 5. PROPOSED AFSOC STRUCTURE
These initiatives bring us full circle from USSOCOM down to the components in theater.
The same process will be applied to the Army and Navy SOF assets as we have demonstrated with the Air component to complete the command and control architecture. Once in place, this modular approach to command and control will afford USSOCOM a flexible yet forceful response to terrorist operations anywhere in the world either as the supported commander or as a supporting commander.
CONCLUSION
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism states, "America will focus decisive military power and specialized intelligence sources to defeat terrorist networks globally." 31 USSOCOM will be the power the United States utilizes to prosecute the global war on terrorism.
USSOCOM has to transform into a supported global combatant command while still performing its Title 10 responsibilities. A modular, scalable standing joint task force will enable USSOCOM to fulfill this requirement. Transforming the organizational architecture from top to bottom will afford USSOCOM the versatility to operate from the front lines or from the beaches of Florida. In order to capitalize on this command and control structure, the heart of the USSOCOM, the soldiers, must be forward deployed.
To see this vision through, USSOCOM must establish a sub-unified command, JTF-GT, with the guidance and freedom to lead the effort against terrorism. This allows the command to concentrate on its service-like responsibilities while JTF-GT concentrates on prosecuting the global campaign. Within JTF-GT will reside two deployable standing joint force headquarters.
This deployable entity gives USSOCOM global coverage and the flexibility to operate within two regions simultaneously or from the joint operations center in Florida. This is enhanced by the theater special operations commands forward presence and regional expertise. Developing a scalable headquarters package between the SJFHQ and the TSOC allows USSOCOM to act as the supported commander and JFC within any region or enhances the supporting relationship to the GCC either as a JTF or a JSOTF. This architecture allows USSOCOM to become a global strategic warfighter with the capability to act along the full spectrum of warfare.
To defeat an asymmetrical threat, USSOCOM must be an asymmetrical force -poised to attack, anywhere at anytime. USSOCOM needs to be the nation's tip of the spear, focused on the eradication of terrorism not nation building. President Bush said it well, "[W]e will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country[.]"
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Resourced and organized correctly, USSOCOM is ready and able to defeat the enemy and defend our nation.
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